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The Washington Forest Practices Act: When is
Compliance with SEPA Required?
Evergreen forest land characterizes nearly one half of Wash-
ington State.' Abundant timber resources are the basis of the
state's giant timber industry2 and a significant factor in the rec-
reational orientation of its citizenry.5 Timber management pol-
icy is therefore paramount to the continuing economic and envi-
ronmental vitality of Washington. In the 1974 Forest Practices
Act (FPA), the legislature delegated major control over protec-
tion and use of forest land resources to the forest practices
board.5 Three years prior to enactment of the FPA, Washington
adopted the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), mandat-
ing consideration of environmental factors in all major state
1. Of Washington's 42.6 million total acres, approximately forty-four percent are
designated commercial forest land. J. SACHET, S. KELLER, A. McCoy, T. O'r & N.
WOLFF, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF WASHINGTON'S FOREST PRACTICES RULES
AND REGULATIONS IN PROTECTING WATER QUALITY - TECHNICAL REPORT 15 (Wash. State
Dep't of Ecology Report No. DOE-80-7A, 1980).
2. From 1976 to 1980, nearly 500,000 acres of Washington forest land was harvested
each year, one-third by clear-cutting methods. STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF FINAN-
CIAL MANAGEMENT, WASHINGTON STATE DATA BOOK 1981, at 112 (1981). These acres pro-
duced over six billion board feet of timber each year with a value of 3.5 billion dollars.
Id. at 112, 114.
3. During 1980, attendance at Washington's twenty-one major state parks reached
21.5 million persons. STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, WASH-
INGTON STATE DATA BOOK 1981, at 141 (1981).
4. Act of Feb. 14, 1974, ch. 137, 1974 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 401 (current version
at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 76.09 (1981)).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.030 (1981). The eleven-member board is composed of
five elected officials, including the Commissioner of Public Lands, and six members of
the general public, two of whom must have affiliations with the timber industry. One
commentary has suggested that such public commissions may not provide the innovative
resources necessary to effect long range social and environmental goals. Cortner &
Schweitzer, Institutional Limits to National Public Planning for Forest Resources: The
Resources Planning Act, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 203, 216 (1981).
6. Enacted in 1971, the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) recognizes the
interdependence of man and his environment and requires consideration of environmen-
tal factors by governmental agencies before they take actions which risk adverse environ-
mental impacts. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020 (1981).
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agency decisions. The original 1974 Forest Practices Act did not
expressly require compliance with SEPA. The 1975 amend-
mentsJ however, specifically exempt certain types of forest prac-
tices from SEPA procedures. These exempted forest practices
avoid stringent environmental impact statement (EIS) review
under SEPA.'
The resulting FPA is incompatible with the functioning of
SEPA because it reduces environmental scrutiny of forest land
activities, despite the recognized potential of timber harvesting
practices for environmental degradation. 0 This apparent statu-
tory inconsistency led to the promulgation of regulations" which
virtually exempt forest land activities from the aegis of SEPA
policy, contrary to express provisions of the Forest Practices
Act.'2
7. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 200, 1975 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 665. The immediate
adverse response from the timber industry to the Forest Practices Act of 1974 precipi-
tated these amendments.
8. "Forest practice" is defined as any activity conducted on or directly pertaining to
forest land and relating to growing, harvesting, or processing timber. WASH. REv. CODE §
76.09.020(8) (1981).
9. For a discussion of the effect of requiring an environmental impact statement
(EIS), see infra note 85.
10. A 1971 report found poor logging road construction to be the major cause of
siltation in Washington's Clearwater River. G. DESCHAMPS, A REPORT ON SILTATION IN
STEQUALEHO CREEK 5 (Dep't of Fisheries, Aug. 4, 1971). The Federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency has also found logging roads to be a primary cause of sedimentation,
erosion, and landslides. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LOGGING
ROADS AND PROTECTION OF WATER QUALITY (1975). In 1979, the Washington State
Department of Ecology prepared several monographs disclosing the impact of logging
road construction and use on the water quality of Washington's streams and rivers.
STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, Reports 79-5a-1 through 79-5a-4 (1979).
Water quality is only one environmental factor affected by forest activities. Critics blame
intensive management techniques such as clear-cutting, designed to maximize timber
production, for deterioration of forest soils, loss of diversified wildlife habitat and recrea-
tional/aesthetic qualities of forests. H. ANDERSON, THE EFFECTS OF CLEARCUTIING ON
STREAM TEMPERATURE, A LITERATURE REVIEW (DNR Report No. 29, Mar. 1973); Liberty,
Forestland Preservation, 5 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 153, 159-61 (1981); Spurr, Clearcutting
on National Forests, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223 (1981).
11. WASH. ADMIN. CODE chs. 222-08 to 222-50 (1980).
12. The Forest Practices Act states:
[Ilt is in the public interest for public and private commercial forest lands to
be managed consistent with sound policies of natural resource protection; that
coincident with the maintenance of a viable forest products industry, it is
important to afford protection to forest soils, fisheries, wildlife, water quantity
and quality, air quality, recreation and scenic beauty.
WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(1) (1981). To implement this policy, the Act requires
review under SEPA for forest practices threatening substantial environmental impact.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981). For further discussion, see infra note 53.
1982] SEPA Compliance Required?
In 1977, state citizens challenged these forest practices regu-
lations ' s when the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) did
not require SEPA review prior to a timber harvest of forest land
adjacent to a state park on Whidbey Island. 4 In Noel v. Cole,1'
the court found the proposed harvest of the Whidbey Island
Classic "U" tract subject to SEPA and the exemption from
SEPA under the forest practices regulations unlawful. The court
criticized the forest practices board for "over-zealous actions
. . . in removing forest practices from SEPA considerations. "
Although recognizing the board's legitimate interest in balancing
the economic impacts of environmental protection with forest
industry needs, the court acknowledged the board's failure to
implement the balance intended by the legislature. The court
concluded "the administrative agencies have done what the Leg-
islature would not do, and have nearly completely exempted
13. Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem. op. (Wash. Super. Ct., Island County, June 23,
1978). Near South Whidbey State Park, on Whidbey Island, the University of Washing-
ton owns a timbered land tract managed by the Department of Natural Resources. In
1977, Whidbey Island residents became aware of the sale and proposed clear-cutting of
the timber from this tract. In protest, they gathered at the site, physically obstructing
the operations. Island County sheriffs dispersed the protesters, and a temporary
restraining order issued two days later. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, CLASSIC "U" TIMBER SALE 3-6
(June 12, 1981) [hereinafter cited as CLASSIC "U" EIS]. The plaintiffs in Noel v. Cole
included Jack Noel, as area resident, and two organizations of Whidbey Island residents,
Save the Trees and SWIFT. The Attorney General intervened as a party plaintiff. Mem-
orandum from John Woodring, Staff Counsel of the Senate Natural Resources Commit-
tee to Senator Peterson and members of the Senate Natural Resources Committee (Mar.
7, 1978) (copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review). Plaintiffs alleged
that the timber sale was not a forest practice regulated by the Forest Practices Act, and
was therefore subject to SEPA. For further discussion of Noel v. Cole, see infra notes 98-
108 and accompanying text.
14. The timber sale itself was actually exempted under SEPA guidelines providing
categorical exemptions for all timber sales. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 197-10-175(4)(g) (1980).
If the DNR had classified the Classic "U" timber harvest as a Class IV - special forest
practice, the harvest would have been subject to SEPA under the Forest Practices Act.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-16-050(1) (1980). The 1975 Forest Practices Act amendment
gave the forest practices board the authority to establish by rule which forest practices
were subject to SEPA as Class IV practices. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-16-050 contains the
forest practice classes, including those designated as Class IV - special. (The entire text
of Class IV is printed infra note 93.) Any forest practice not classified as a Class IV -
special practice is exempt from SEPA procedures under WASH. ADMIN. CODE 197-10-
170(19)(a) (1980), the state SEPA guidelines. The Classic "U" timber harvest had been
designated as Class III by the DNR. Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem. op. at 15 (Wash.
Super. Ct., Island County, June 23, 1978).
15. Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem. op. (Wash. Super. Ct., Island County, June 23,
1978).
16. Id. at 15.
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DNR and the timber industry from the provisions of SEPA." 1
The Classic "U" controversy prompted the legislature to
amend SEPA in 1981.18 The SEPA amendment parallels the
FPA by exempting from EIS requirements agency decisions con-
cerning the same forest practices previously exempted under the
FPA.19 The impact of this amendment on the interpretation of
the FPA is unsettled.2 0 The new SEPA provisions, however,
indicate legislative approval of the Classic "U" holding that any
forest practice operation with significant environmental conse-
quences is subject to SEPA under the Forest Practices Act.2 1
The Forest Practices Act recognizes the importance of the
17. Id. at 16.
18. Act of May 18, 1981, ch. 290, 1980 Wash. Legis. Serv. 887 (West) (codified at
WASH. Rav. CODE § 43.21C.037 (1981)).
The forest industry proposed the amendment as a technical change to prevent a
court finding that the SEPA exemptions in the Forest Practices Act amended SEPA and
were therefore invalid. Hearing on S.B. 3725 Before the Senate Natural Resources Com-
mittee, 47th Legis., at Olympia (Mar. 4, 1981) (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
The fear was prompted by the action of the Washington Supreme Court in 1979,
striking down § 76.09.240(a), (c) of the Forest Practices Act dealing with local govern-
ment authority over forest practices under the Shoreline Management Act, WASH. REv.
CODE ch. 90.58 (1981). Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721, 592 P.2d
1108 (1979). The court reasoned that the Forest Practices Act's section which limited
local governments' authority under the Shoreline Management Act was in effect an
amendment of the Shoreline Management Act. Id. at 729, 592 P.2d at 1113. Because the
legislature had failed to indicate an amendment to the Shoreline Management Act when
passing § 76.09.240(a), (c) of the Forest Practices Act, the passage of that section was
procedurally invalid under art. II, § 37, of the Washington State Constitution. Id. at 730,
592 P.2d at 1114.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 73-84.
20. The effect of the SEPA exemptions in the 1975 amendments to the Forest Prac-
tices Act was initially questioned in Comment, Protection of Recreation and Scenic
Beauty under the Washington Forest Practices Act, 53 WASH. L. REv. 443, 458-61 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty]. The com-
ment's author concluded that the Forest Practices Act may require the forest practices
board to comply with SEPA, but noted that the board in promulgating the forest prac-
tices regulations did not follow that interpretation. Id. at 461. In fact, both the board, in
adopting forest practices regulations, and the DNR, in proceeding under them, assume
that forest practices are exempt from SEPA unless designated by the board as Class IV
activities. Class IV practices, by definition, require a Department of Natural Resources
evaluation under SEPA procedure. See letter from Eugene Nielson for Brian Boyle,
Washington State Commissioner of Public Lands, to Senator Art Gallaghan and Repre-
sentative Wilma Rosbach (Oct. 27, 1981) (on file with the University of Puget Sound
Law Review).
The impact of the 1981 SEPA amendment on the Forest Practices Act is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 71-91.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 98-106. Noel v. Cole is a superior court deci-
sion and is not necessarily binding on any other court faced with a similar case.
SEPA Compliance Required?
state's valuable timber resources and balances industry needs
for efficient timber management with protection of the state's
environmental quality, including fisheries, wildlife, water and air
quality, recreation, and scenic beauty.2 ' Notwithstanding the
FPA's provisions for reduced environmental review, the Act does
not authorize the forest practices board to adopt regulations
that virtually exempt forest practices from SEPA's EIS
requirements.' s
To analyze the problems created by the FPA's scheme for
environmental review, this comment first examines the statutory
definitions of the forest practices classes, determining which for-
est practice classes are within the scope of SEPA review under
the Forest Practices Act. Second, the comment discusses the
effect of the 1981 SEPA amendment on the types of forest prac-
tices exempt from SEPA. The comment further points out the
failure of the existing forest practices regulations to achieve the
policy balance required by the Forest Practices Act. The com-
ment's conclusion is two-fold: the Classic "U" holding best rep-
resents the legislature's statutory intent regarding the scope of
SEPA review of forest practices; continued failure of the forest
practices board to reconcile its regulations with the legislative
directive will necessitate an FPA amendment requiring strict
environmental review of all forest practices.
I. THE FOREST PRACTICES ACT
Under the FPA, the forest practices board must classify for-
est practices according to environmental impact.' The greater
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(1) (1981). A portion of the policy statement of the
Forest Practices Act is quoted supra note 12.
23. The Forest Practices Board essentially ignored the policy declaration when
promulgating the forest practices rules. See Comment, Protection of Recreation and
Scenic Beauty, supra note 20, at 454-56. At best, the rules were intended to provide
adequate water quality protections. Government researchers assessing the regulations for
water quality protection concluded that when there was compliance with the forest prac-
tices regulations adverse impacts on quality were rare. J. SACHET, S. KELLER, A. McCoy,
T. Or & N. WOLFF, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF WASHINGTON'S FOREST PRAC-
TICES RULES AND REGULATIONS IN PROTECTING WATER QuALrrv - SUMMARY REPORT 15, 19
(Wash. State Dep't of Ecology Report No. DOE 80-7, 1980). The study further revealed,
however, widespread noncompliance with road maintenance regulations making docu-
mentation of the effectiveness of water-related regulations difficult. Id. at 19. The team
evaluated 102 forest practice applications; only 22 were conducted in complete compli-
ance with water quality related regulations. Id. at 20.
24. The Forest Practices Act provides that the forest practices board shall establish
by rule which forest practices are within the statutory definitions. WASH. REv. CODE §
1982]
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the environmental impact, the more stringent the statutory
requirements of DNR review and authorization. The class defini-
tions also determine whether an included practice is subject to
SEPA provisions.2 6
By rule, the forest practices board designates the practices
that are included within each statutory class-" The board's
authority to classify forest practices is limited only by the
requirement that each practice be assessed in light of the statu-
tory criteria. In exercising this authority, the board must satisfy
the purposes and policies of the FPA.27 The statutory structure
of the Act implies that some forest practices will be subject to
SEPA under the class definitions.2 8
A. The 1974 Act
The original Forest Practices Act of 1974"2 made no refer-
ence to SEPA, but, because SEPA was concurrently in effect,
presumably all forest practices requiring the DNR approval were
to be evaluated for possible SEPA review.80 Environmental pro-
tection and maintenance of a healthy forest products industry
was to be assured by the regulation of three classes of forest
76.09.050(1) (1981).
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050 (1981).
26. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-16-050 (1980).
27. The forest practices board is expressly authorized to promulgate rules "[wihere
necessary to accomplish the purposes and policies" of the Forest Practices Act. WASH.
REV. CODE § 76.09.040(1) (1981). See supra note 23.
28. See discussion of Class IV, infra text accompanying notes 51-53 and 94-97. In
relevant part, Class IV is defined as those forest practices "which have a potential for a
substantial impact on the environment and therefore require an evaluation. . . pursuant
to [SEPA]." WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
29. Act of Feb. 14, 1974, ch. 137, 1974 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 401 (current version
at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 76.09 (1981)).
The history of the passage of the original FPA is complex. Conscious of the increas-
ing public awareness of environmental problems and fearful of the potential for strict
federally imposed controls under the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act amend-
ments, Washington State's forest industry promoted the initial legislation. Comment,
Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty, supra note 20, at 446-47. First introduced
in February 1973, House Bill 637 required eight major drafts before it met with legisla-
tive approval a year later. D. Syrdal & J. Keegan, The Washington Forest Practices Act
of 1974, Part II, at 11 (May 21, 1975) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Univer-
sity of Puget Sound Law Review).
30. The Act did not expressly mention SEPA. It did, however, provide that nothing
contained in the Forest Practices Act would modify other concurrently operative state
statutes which would include SEPA. Act of Feb. 14, 1974, ch. 137, § 32, 1974 Wash. Laws
1st Ex. Seass. 401, 402 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981)).
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practices."' Of the three classes, only Class I practices were iden-
tified by their relationship to the environment, but notification
of the DNR prior to conducting such a practice was not
required."' By definition, Class II and III practices required an
approved application and were differentiated from each other
only by the period of time allowed for approval of an applica-
tion."3 Significantly, the statute did not describe the permissible
environmental impact of practices to be included in either Class
II or Class III."
B. The 1975 Amendments to the FPA
The current Forest Practices Act, amended in 1975,35 pre-
31. Section 5(1) of the Forest Practices Act of 1974 contained the following
provisions:
Class I: Minimal or specific forest practices that may be conducted with-
out submitting an application: PROVIDED, That no forest practice shall be
within Class I if it has a direct potential for damaging a public resource.
Class II: Forest practices for which the application must be approved or
disapproved by the department within fourteen calendar days from the date
the department receives the application.
Class III: Forest practices for which the application must be approved or
disapproved by the department within thirty calendar days from the date the
department receives the application.
Act of Feb. 14, 1974, ch. 137, § 5(1), 1974 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 401, 406 [hereinafter
Act of Feb. 14, § 5].
32. Id. § 5(1).
33. Id.
34. See supra note 31.
35. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 200, 1975 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Seas. 665.
The new Forest Practices Act was amended before it was even implemented. Prepa-
ration for promulgating forest practices regulations had actually begun prior to final pas-
sage of the 1974 Forest Practices Act. Draft regulations from at least two sources were
presented to the forest practices advisory committee by June of 1974. D. Syrdal & J.
Keegan, The Washington Forest Practices Act of 1974, Part III, at 3-4 (May 21, 1975)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
Adoption of regulations was delayed, however, until after the 1975 legislative session.
Final regulations became effective on July 16, 1976. STATE OF WASHINGTON FoREsT PRAc-
TICES BOARD, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED FOREST PRACTICES
RULES AND REGULA7IONS CHANGES (WASH. ADMIN. CODE tit. 222) 2-5 (Oct. 1, 1981) [here-
inafter cited as PROPOSED REGULATIONS CHANGES EIS].
Regulation of forest practices prior to 1974 had consisted mainly of minimal
reforestation requirements in a 1945 statute. Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, 1945 Wash.
Laws 556 (repealed 1974). Opposition to the new act appeared immediately. Contract
loggers and small "woodlot" timber owners feared that the extra operating cost attribu-
table to the Forest Practices Act requirements would drive them out of business.
Opponents organized to obtain repeal and were successful in the Washington State
Senate on April 21, 1975. 1 Senate Journal 1036, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1975). Nine days
later, House Bill 1078 (the 1975 amendments to the Forest Practices Act) passed the
House and was transmitted to the Senate. 1 Senate Journal 1182, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess.
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serves the original purposes and policy statements," but pro-
vides for four, instead of three, forest practices classes with more
detailed environmental impact criteria,3 7 and a complex notifica-
tion-application system in place of the original application pro-
cedure.88 The amended Act also grants specific class exemp-
tions39 from the SEPA requirement of an EIS.'0
Initially, it is important to note that the legislature has at
no time declared the Forest Practices Act exempt from SEPA. 1
Instead, the legislature amended the FPA to exempt three of the
four classes of forest practices from EIS requirements.42 The
amended Act defines the classes with criteria related to environ-
mental impact.43 Arguably, the amended Act as a whole remains
subject to SEPA, an attribute significant to the board's rules
classifying forest practices."
(1975). The Senate committee substituted its own version of the Forest Practices Act
amendments onto House Bill 1078. House Journal 1186, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1975). A
compromise version resulted and House Bill 1078 passed the Senate, just one month
after the Senate had emphatically repealed the entire act. 2 Senate Journal 2220-23, 1st
Ex. Sess. (1975).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010 (1981). The 1975 amendments made no change in
the legislative finding and declarations section of the 1974 act.
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 45-58
for discussion of the forest practices classes.
38. The original 1974 Act required application approval by the Department of Natu-
ral Resources for both Class II and Class III forest practices. See Act of Feb. 14, § 5. In
contrast, the amended Act requires only departmental notification for Class II forest
practices and the submission of applications for Class III and Class IV forest practices.
WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
39. Forest practices under Classes I, II, and III are exempted from EIS require-
ments, but Class IV practices are not. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
40. Environmental impact statements are required under SEPA for any major
action significantly affecting the quality of the environment. WASH. REV. CODE §
43.21C.030(2)(c) (1981). See infra note 85 discussing the function of an EIS under SEPA.
41. See supra text accompanying note 17.
42. These SEPA exemptions of Class I, II, and III forest practices function inte-
grally with the forest practices classes definitions. The relationship is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 58-70.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
44. During the drafting of the original forest practices regulations in 1974, the forest
practices board displayed considerable reluctance to acknowledge the applicability of
SEPA to the promulgation of the regulations. D. Syrdal & J. Keegan, The Washington
Forest Practices Act of 1974, Part III, at 11-12 & nn.64-65 (May 21, 1975) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review). Although a full EIS
was eventually prepared, there is no record of a formal decision by the board to under-
take an EIS. Id.
County officials criticized the proposed rules for failure to consider several environ-
mental factors, including failure to address SEPA requirements. Id. at 15. However, it is
clear that the intense opposition to the new Forest Practices Act, see supra note 35, was
felt by the board, who feared that stringent regulations would result in reprisal by the
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The FPA's statutory classes provide the guidelines to which
the board's rules must conform. The amended Act defines Class
I practices as minimal or specific practices"5 with no direct
potential for damaging a public resource.46 Conducting such
practices requires neither notification of the DNR nor a per-
mit.47 Class II practices are those having less than ordinary
potential for damaging a public resource.48 Prior to commencing
a Class II practice, the DNR must be notified, although no
approval is needed. 9 In addition, forest practices under Class I
and II are exempt from the SEPA's EIS requirement.5 0
The Act defines Class IV forest practices by their relation-
ship to the environment, rather than to public resources.5 Class
IV excludes those practices determined to be Class I or II, but
includes all other practices having a potential for substantial
impact on the environment.2' This class is not included in the
EIS exemption; approval of Class IV applications requires
agency evaluation under SEPA5
legislature. Id. at 10.
When changes in the forest practice regulations were drafted in 1981, an EIS was
prepared as a routine matter, apparently without comment. See PROPOSED REGULATIONS
CHANGES EIS, supra note 35.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981). "Specific" is not defined by the Act; it
may indicate that engaging in multiple practices requires a Class II application.
46. This definition is similar to the 1974 definition of Class I. See Act of Feb. 14, §
5. Public resources are defined as water, fish and wildlife, and capital improvements of
the state. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.020(13) (1981).




51. Id. A discussion of the significance of "environment" in the FPA may be found
infra text accompanying notes 86-89. Public resources are defined supra note 46.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981). See infra note 94 for the full text of the
Class IV definition.
53. The FPA clearly includes in Class IV those forest practices "which have a poten-
tial for a substantial impact on the environment and therefore require an evaluation by
the department as to whether or not a detailed statement must be prepared pursuant to
the State Environmental Policy Act." WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981). It is not
clear, however, why the legislature used "potential for substantial impact on the environ-
ment" to identify those practices to be evaluated under SEPA when the language in
SEPA itself reads "significantly affecting the quality of the environment." WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1981). The disparity of language between these two statutes is
discussed in Comment, Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty, supra note 20, at
461 n.79. The author concludes that the language of the Forest Practices Act does not
appear to require a higher degree of impact on the environment before SEPA will apply.
Id.
Only indirect legislative history is available on the point. Prior to final passage of
the 1975 amendments containing the "substantial impact" Class IV definition, Senator
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Unlike the other forest practices classes, Class III contains
no explicit environmental standard." The Act directs that forest
practices not otherwise contained in Classes I, II, or IV consti-
tute Class III.55 An application approved by the DNR is
required.se
The definitions limit the permissible environmental impact
of practices within each class and specifically exclude practices
within other classes. As a result of the exclusiveness, classifica-
tion of a forest practice requires consideration of the environ-
mental standards provided for each class.57 These environmental
impact criteria, when considered with the EIS exemptions of
Classes I, II, and III, seem to indicate legislative intent regarding
the level of environmental scrutiny required in the board's
rules.58
The addition of Class I, II, and III SEPA exemptions has
proved confusing.50 Simply stated, rules exempting any forest
practice from specific SEPA requirements must comply with the
criteria identifying Class IV in the Forest Practices Act.6 0 In
effect, Class IV acts as a specific statutory limit on SEPA-
Lewis was qpestioned regarding Class IV practices. He replied that Class IV would
include "only those operations that entail serious potential environmental consequences
that the forest practices regulations and/or forest practices regulations EIS have not cov-
ered or are [otherwise] inadequately treated under the circumstances." 2 Senate Journal
2220, 1st Ex. Sess. (1975) (emphasis added). Thus, it seems that "serious," "substantial,"
and "significant" are being used similarly by members of the legislature and that all of
these terms indicate the need for SEPA compliance.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem. op. (Wash. Super. Ct., bland County, June
23, 1978). This case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
58. Other indications of legislative intent regarding environmental protection appear
in the FPA. The Act affords nearly absolute protection to public resources by authoriz-
ing inspection of ongoing forest practices to insure that no material damage to public
resources occurs, WASH. REy. CODE § 76.09.150 (1981), and providing for official sanctions
to prevent material damage to a public resource, WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.080-.090
(1981).
59. In an effort to clarify the environmental protection required for state forest land
managed by the Department of Natural Resources, the Washington Environmental
Council filed a case on behalf of all Washington citizens in 1977. Washington Environ-
mental Council v. Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 59182 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston
County, filed Jan. 23, 1978). The Council sought to establish that all timber sales from
state-managed trust lands were subject to SEPA. Another case, filed in October of 1980,
alleged that the exemptions from SEPA in the Forest Practices Act violated the state
constitution. Steelhead Trout Club v. Cole, No. 80-2-01303 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston
County, filed Oct. 29, 1980).
60. See the Class IV definition infra note 94.
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exempt practices.6 1 Nevertheless, the board continues to exempt
forest practices with a potential for serious environmental degra-
dation by restricting the reach of the Class IV regulation.2 Such
action is not supported by the Act.
The criteria distinguishing the forest practices classes sug-
gests legislative intent to limit the practices exempted from
SEPA evaluation. For instance, because the DNR is not required
to approve Class I or II activities, 3 the exemption of Class I and
II is consistent with the SEPA policy that requires an EIS only
when a governmental body undertakes a major action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the environment." As the DNR
exercises no discretion with regard to undertaking Class I or II
forest practices, there is no major action within the meaning of
SEPA. Interpreting the FPA to require that Class I and II
practices satisfy the SEPA definition of a nonmajor action auto-
matically limits Class I and II practices without reference to the
environmental standards in the definitions. Without this inter-
pretation, the FPA directly collides with SEPA provisions.s
Class III is also exempt from the EIS requirement but the
DNR must approve these practices prior to their commence-
ment.67 Because such approval may constitute a major action
under SEPA, arguably the legislative exemption means that
61. A discussion of the forest practices regulation's Class IV is found infra notes 92-
97 and accompanying text.
62. See PROPOSED REGULATIONS CHANGES EIS, supra note 35. The changes in the
rules were undertaken in response to the Classic "U" decision, see infra text accompany-
ing note 103, finding the forest practices regulation's Class IV invalid. PROPOSED REGULA-
TIONS CHANGES EIS, supra note 35, at 5-6. Nevertheless, the proposed regulations will
continue to exempt some practices from Class IV even though the board's special study
committee identified these as practices which "can have potential for a substantial
impact." Id. at 52, 55. See infra note 94 discussing the new rules.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1981).
65. A major action is governmental action having both discretionary and nondupli-
cative qualities. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash. 2d 754, 764, 513 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1973).
There is no discretion when, as here, the Department of Natural Resources cannot forbid
the commencement of a forest practice under Class I or II. The Department may only
require that notification be received for Class II practices. WASH. REv. CODE §
76.09.050(1) (1981). However, Class I and II forest practices must be conducted in
accordance with the forest practices regulations and are subject to the official sanctions
authorized by the Act for any violations. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(4) (1981).
66. Unless the exemption of Class I and II is applied consistently with SEPA, the
danger exists of an implied amendment of SEPA by the FPA. Such an amendment is
unconstitutional under article II, section 37, of the Washington State Constitution. See
supra note 18.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
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Class III must exclude practices that significantly affect the
environment. In any case, the exemption supports the view that
Class III cannot include practices with a potential for substan-
tial impact on the environment because those practices must be
evaluated under SEPA pursuant to Class IV."5
Evaluating Class III practices is complicated by the absence
of an environmental standard in the definition. To satisfy all the
statutory requirements, however, the board must include within
Class III only practices with ordinary (or greater) potential for
damaging the environment or a public resource,6' not practices
with the potential for substantial environmental impact. Even
though no such definition is articulated in the Forest Practices
Act, the statutory requirements support the inference that per-
missible Class III environmental impact is limited, which
restricts the types of practices that the DNR may approve with-
out SEPA review.70
Although the Forest Practices Act provides guiding stan-
dards for determination of the forest practices to be included
within each class, it is clear that the board should not interpret
without reference to SEPA the environmental protection each
classification requires. The Forest Practices Act's definitions,
which provide for only limited exemptions from SEPA, support
the view that the board's classifications must facilitate compli-
ance with SEPA when the DNR applies the exemptions to forest
practices. At the same time, reading the class definitions to
include only practices that comply with SEPA limits the scope
of the practices allowable in each class.
68. Id.
69. The forest practices board evidently accepts a similar definition. PROPOSED REG-
ULATIONS CHANGES EIS, supra note 35, at 60.
70. When the legislature enacts a statutory definition, such definition controls the
interpretation of the defined term. Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wash. 2d 25, 548 P.2d
541 (1976). The Washington Supreme Court also presumes that when a definition
expressly includes certain matters, other matters not expressed are excluded. Id.
Thus, forest practices included in Classes I, II, and IV must fall within the scope of
the environmental criterion expressed in each of their definitions. All other forest prac-
tices, necessarily excluded from Classes I, II, and IV by definition, are encompassed by
Class III. However, as Class III has not been given an environmental definition, the
intent of the legislature with regard to the permissible environmental impact of Class III
practices must be deduced from the statutory context and from what the legislature said
about the other forest practices classes. Cf. Champion v. Shoreline School Dist. No. 412,
81 Wash. 2d 672, 504 P.2d 304 (1972) (interpreting the scope of "certified employee"
under WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.67.070 (1971)).
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II. 1981 SEPA AMENDMENT
During the 1981 legislative session, 1 SEPA was amended 2
to exempt "decisions pertaining to applications for Class I, II,
and III forest practices, as defined by the rule of the forest prac-
tices board" from the requirements of an EIS.73 The SEPA
amendment is limited explicitly to forest practice application
decisions. It is a narrow exemption compared to the broader
exemption of forest practices from SEPA procedures in the For-
est Practices Act.7
4
Whether this SEPA amendment modifies the interpretation
of the necessary forest practices class review under SEPA is
doubtful.75 The history of the SEPA amendment indicates that
71. The legislature actively reviewed environmental legislation during 1981. A Sen-
ate Study resolution established a joint House and Senate Select Committee to report on
the implementation of the Forest Practices Act. 2d Sub. S. Floor Res. 81-82, 47th Legis.,
Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981). Senate Bill 4190 was also passed to provide for a two year
study of SEPA requiring a report and recommendations to the 1983 legislature. Act of
May 18, 1981, ch. 289, 1981 Wash. Legis. Serv. 886 (West) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.037 (1981)).
72. Act of May 18, 1981, ch. 290, 1981 Wash. Legis. Serv. 886 (West) (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.037 (1981)). This amendment contains a sunset provision,
causing it to expire on June 30, 1983, unless extended by law. Id.
73. The requirements referred to in the amendment are listed in SEPA:
[A]ll branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal
and public corporations, and counties . . . include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between the local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments or resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1981).
74. The SEPA exemptions added to the Forest Practices Act in 1975, Act of June
16, 1975, ch. 200, 1975 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Seas. 594; see discussion supra note 35 and
accompanying text, provide that forest practices under Class I, II, and III are exempt
from SEPA procedures. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
75. The legislative action during the 1981 session was equivocal. Although several
bills related to the FPA were introduced, they were intended to correct the apparent
constitutional deficiencies in the Act and were not directly addressed to the forest prac-
tices classes definitions. See memorandum from John Woodring, Staff Counsel for the
Senate Natural Resources Committee, to members of the Senate Natural Resources
Committee (Mar. 3, 1981) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
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the major concern of its timber industry proponents was the
potential for a judicial invalidation of the Forest Practices Act
exemption provisions as an unconstitutional amendment of
SEPA.76 The only constitutional challenge to the SEPA exemp-
tions in the FPA decided prior to the 1981 legislative sessions
was Noel v. Cole. 77 There, the court rejected plaintiff's argument
that the FPA's SEPA exemptions unconstitutionally amended
SEPA and construed the FPA and SEPA harmoniously, finding
that interpretation of the forest practices class definitions
requires compliance with SEPA s
Members of the 1981 legislature were very aware of the
Noel v. Cole decision,79 yet the 1981 SEPA amendment reflects
an intent to narrow the SEPA exemption. Had the legislature
desired to reject the Noel v. Cole reconciliation of the FPA and
SEPA provisions, broad language exempting the entire Forest
Practices Act from SEPA would have been necessary.80 The
effect of the amendment's new language is not to eliminate
required compliance with SEPA when the board makes rules
applying the forest practices class definitions. Rather, the
amendment only exempts actions pertaining to forest practices
application decisions.
The amendment's exemption clearly encompasses Class III
application approval," and suggests that discretion to approve
or disapprove a Class III practice application is not subject to
SEPA. 8 But it is not evident whether the exemption extends to
76. See supra note 18.
77. No. 78-9806, mem. op. (Wash. Super. Ct., Island County, June 23, 1978).
78. See infra note 101. In Noel v. Cole, the court asserted that if the legislature
wished to exempt forest practices from SEPA it must say so. Also see supra text accom-
panying notes 15-17 for the context of that statement. Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem.
op. at 10 (Wash. Super. Ct., Island County, June 23, 1978).
79. During floor debate in the House, one representative remarked that the forest
practices board had failed to comply with the intent of the Class IV designation. House
Journal 630, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981). Legislators had closely followed the progress of
the Classic "U" controversy over the preceding several years. See Hearing on S.B. 3725
Before the Senate Natural Resources Committee, 47th Legis., at Olympia (Mar. 4, 1981)
(on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review); memorandum from John
Woodring, Staff Counsel of the Senate Natural Resources Committee, to Senator Peter-
son and members of the Senate Natural Resources Committee (Mar. 7, 1978) (on file
with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
80. See supra note 78.
81. Because approved applications are required only for Class III and IV, the
amendment seems to unnecessarily exempt Class I and II application decisions.
82. The FPA provides the DNR with discretion to disapprove a satisfactorily com-
pleted application for failure to comply with the provisions of the Act or the forest prac-
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other DNR actions under the FPA. The DNR must also deter-
mine the class designation of each application.s If not included
within the exempted activity, this DNR discretion under the
FPA is limited by its role as a state agency under SEPA."
Compliance with SEPA requires more than writing and
reviewing an EIS.85 SEPA creates an independent duty to con-
tices regulations. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(5) (1981). The forest practices regula-
tions, on the other hand, state that applications shall be approved except to the extent
the department finds an application incomplete, improperly filed, or inaccurate. It may
also be disapproved if the applicable county has filed timely objections to the approval.
If portions of an application must be disapproved, any portion which can be separately
conducted in compliance with the regulations without reasonable risk to the public
resources shall be approved. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-20-040(l)-(3) (1980). Although data
are not kept, the DNR estimates that very few, if any, applications have actually been
denied. Interview with Eugene Nielson, Private Forestry Division, Department of Natu-
ral Resources, in Olympia (July 28, 1981).
83. When the Department of Natural Resources receives an application or notifica-
tion (an identical form is used for both), the application is reviewed by the DNR for
designation of the proper forest practices class. Each forest practice described on the
application is evaluated first under the criteria for Class IV in the forest practices regula-
tions, and then as a Class I or II. If it meets none of those criteria, it is designated as
Class III. Interview with Eugene Nielson, Private Forestry Division, Department of Nat-
ural Resources, in Olympia (July 28, 1981). If the application does not request a forest
practice listed in the Class IV regulations, the department does not complete an environ-
mental checklist or make any other threshold determination. Letter from Eugene Niel-
son for Brian Boyle, Washington State Commissioner of Public Lands, to Senator Art
Gallaghan and Representative Wilma Rosbach (Oct. 27, 1981) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Puget Sound Law Review); see WASH. ADMIN. CODE 332-40-315 (1980).
84. It is unclear whether the decision to designate the application's forest practices
class is included within the meaning of the SEPA exemption. To the extent that the
classification of forest practices is the responsibility of the forest practices board in the
promulgation of the regulations, the DNR has little discretion. The DNR apparently
views the classification of an application as a nondiscretionary function. See supra note
83. The Washington Supreme Court, however, has determined there is discretion when-
ever choice exists, however narrow the statutory criteria may be. Loveless v. Yantis, 82
Wash. 2d 754, 764, 513 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1973). Under this rule, the DNR must be viewed
as taking discretionary action whenever forest practice applications are given class
designations.
85. An EIS is the method required by SEPA to insure full disclosure of environmen-
tal information so that environmental matters can be properly considered during rele-
vant decisionmaking. Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County
Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 272, 552 P.2d 674, 677 (1976). When an EIS is required under
SEPA, as in the decision to approve a Class IV application, compliance with SEPA
requires the acting agency to both disclose and actually consider environmental impacts
before taking an action significantly affecting the quality of the environment Id. at 275,
552 P.2d at 679. If, however, a governmental agency makes a determination of no signifi-
cant environmental impact under SEPA, it must show that environmental factors were
considered in a manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance with the
procedural requirements of SEPA. Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirk-
land, 9 Wash. App. 59, 73, 510 P.2d 1140, 1149 (1973). Whether the decision to prepare
an EIS results from the consideration of the environmental factors is immaterial; the
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sider environmental impacts when class designation of an appli-
cation will exempt a forest practice from SEPA, and mandates
identification of any forest practice which, when undertaken,
would result in a significant adverse impact on the environ-
ment.86 Once identified, the DNR must evaluate the practice to
assess the effect on aesthetics, economic factors, social factors,
and a range of physical environmental factors, and determine
the cumulative impacts.87 These factors must be balanced to
ensure that any action taken is consistent with the right of
Washington's citizens to a healthful environment.8" An exemp-
tion may not result from the application's class designation
when the requested forest practice is the type of activity to
which the legislature intended these SEPA safeguards to
apply."'
This conclusion is supported by the legislative definitions of
forest practices classes,90 which imply that the board's class rules
must give consideration to both SEPA policies and the require-
ments of the Forest Practices Act.9 1 The 1981 SEPA amendment
consideration is required. City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90
Wash. 2d 856, 868, 586 P.2d 470, 477 (1978).
86. The SEPA guidelines, designed to clarify an agency's role under SEPA, exempt
numerous DNR activities from SEPA provisions. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 332-40-170(19)
(1980). However, the guidelines also limit the scope of these categorical exemptions. Spe-
cifically, agency proposals or actions that include a series of exempt actions "physically
or functionally related to each other, . . . which together may have a significant environ-
mental impact" are not exempt. Id. 332-40-190(4). But cf. Downtown Traffic Planning
Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wash. App. 156, 612 P.2d 430 (1980) (agency applying an exemption
under SEPA guidelines must consider the likely environmental effects before exempting
the activity pursuant to guideline criteria).
87. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978). Not
every Class IV practice requires an EIS. Under SEPA, the DNR must evaluate the forest
practice for the possible need for an environmental impact statement. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.020 (1981).
88. SEPA's recognized purpose is not only prevention of further environmental deg-
radation but also reversal, where possible, of ecological damage already done. ASARCO,
Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685, 701, 601 P.2d 501, 515 (1979). The DNR
may base its action on disclosures in the EIS; SEPA confers the authority to deny a
forest practice application because of environmental considerations. See Polygon Corp. v.
City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
89. The Free Conference Committee, the drafter of the final version of the 1975
amendments to the Forest Practices Act, see supra note 35, apparently believed that the
Forest Practices Act and the forest practices regulations would provide adequate protec-
tion against the environmentally adverse consequences of most, but not all, forest prac-
tices. 2 Senate Journal 2220, 1st Ex. Sess. (1975).
90. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definitions
of the forest practices classes.
91. See infra text at notes 99-103.
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cannot be read as a clear legislative mandate to exclude the For-
est Practices Act from SEPA. The amendment's narrow focus
requires the DNR to evaluate forest practices applications,
designating the appropriate class to achieve the environmental
protections mandated by the Forest Practices Act. Recognizing
Class IV practices is crucial to the DNR's application of SEPA
exemptions, but the regulations fail to provide adequate
guidance.
III. THE BOARD'S RULES
The board, pursuant to its rulemaking authority, is required
to assess the environmental impact of forest practices and cate-
gorize them according to the statutory class definitions.9 The
regulations, however, fail in any practical sense to distinguish
between Class III and Class IV practices. Thus, they cannot ade-
quately guide the DNR's assessment of applications."
The specific practices conclusively identified as Class IV
practices" are so limited that they rarely are present in timber
92. See WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
93. See infra note 83.
94. The Forest Practices Act defines Class IV as:
Class IV: Forest practices other than those contained in Class I or II: (a)
On lands platted after January 1, 1960, (b) on lands being converted to another
use, (c) on lands which, pursuant to RCW 76.09.070 as now or hereafter
amended, are not to be reforested because of the likelihood of future conver-
sion to urban development, and/or (d) which have a potential for substantial
impact on the environment and therefore require an evaluation by the depart-
ment as to whether or not a detailed statement must be prepared pursuant to
the State Environmental Policy Act, chapter 43.21C RCW.
WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1981).
The Forest Practices Board has interpreted the use of the disjunctive and the con-
junctive phrase as granting authority to divide Class IV into Class IV - general and Class
IV - special. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-16-050(1)-(2) (1980). Only Class IV - special is
subject to EIS requirements. The regulations provide as follows:
(1) "Class IV - Special.".
(a) Harvesting, road construction, site preparation or aerial application of
pesticide on lands known to contain the nest or breeding grounds of any
threatened or endangered species of wildlife as designated by the Department
of Game in accordance with federal criteria and procedure, and approved by
the Board.
(b) Widespread use of DDT or a similar persistent insecticide.
(c) Harvesting or road construction on landlocked parcels within the
boundaries of any national park, State park or any part of a local governmen-
tal entity.
(d) Utilization of an alternate plan except those involving field evaluation
of a new forest practice technology or any reforestation practice.
Id. New regulations promulgated June 25, 1982, to become effective Oct. 1, 1982, make
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management activities.'" While limiting Class IV to the occur-
rence of certain unusual conditions, the rules provide the DNR
with no method for identifying "usual" forest practices opera-
tions that may have "potential for substantial impact on the
environment." Although a greater than ordinary environmental
impact may result when a number of moderately impacting
practices are conducted together, such an effect is not recognized
in the rules." Nor do the rules require evaluation of site specific
conditions that indicate a potential for serious impact.9 EIS
several changes in Class IV - special. The new regulations limit unscrutinized pesticide
applications in watersheds, although they do not address the problem of water quality
degradation from harvesting activities. Importantly, the new regulations require environ-
mental evaluation when certain forest practices are proposed for steep slopes near water-
courses. Amendments to WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-16-050, Wash. Admin. Reg. 82-16-077
(1982) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE 222-16-050).
Although significant, these changes still fail to provide the DNR with the flexibility
needed to function in compliance with SEPA.
95. Prior to the final vote in the Senate on the 1975 amendments to the Forest
Practices Act, Senator Lewis stated that the Free Conference Committee believed that
the Forest Practices Act and regulations would provide sufficient environmental protec-
tion for ninety-five percent of forest practices. 2 Senate Journal 2220, 1st Ex. Sess.
(1975). The legislature apparently expected that approximately five percent of forest
practices would require an evaluation by the Department of Natural Resources as to
whether an EIS was required. However, the department estimated that as of March,
1978, eleven forest practices were determined to be in Class IV - special out of over
27,000 forest practice applications. Hearing on S.B. 3725 Before the Senate Natural
Resources Committee, 47th Legis., at Olympia (Mar. 4, 1981) (testimony of Daniel D.
Syrdal) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review). Only two of the eleven
Class IV - special practices required the preparation of an EIS, both for chemical appli-
cations. Since then, fewer than ten Class IV - special applications have been received by
the department. No EIS's were required. Interview with Eugene Nielson, Private For-
estry Division, Department of Natural Resources, in Olympia (July 28, 1981).
96. A proposed activity may contribute to existing adverse conditions or uses in the
affected area. Such cumulative impact is a relevant factor to be considered under SEPA.
ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685, 705, 601 P.2d 501, 514 (1979).
In ASARCO, Inc., the court found significant environmental impact when a continuing
level of sulfur dioxide emissions would cumulatively exceed the level authorized by the
Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency.
No provision in the forest practices regulations addresses the cumulative impact of
forest practices, or the conditions under which such impacts might require EIS evalua-
tion. Recently, however, upon the recommendation of the Class IV - Special Technical
Committee, the forest practices board began planning for a cumulative effects study.
Minutes of the State of Washington Forest Practices Board 5 (May 21, 1981) (on file
with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
97. Apparently the board prefers to allow the DNR to impose conditions on the
application which are intended to mitigate the potential adverse impacts. PROPOSED REG-
ULATMONS CHANGES EIS, supra note 35, at 60, 64. The DNR, however, views the invalida-
tion of the Class IV regulations by the Noel v. Cole court as providing the department
the necessary latitude to review Class III applications for significant impact. Several such
Class III applications were cited to the board as examples of practices that required
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requirements cannot be effectively or lawfully implemented
without a definite standard for Class III exemptions.
Noel v. Cole"8 illustrates the unlawful exercise of the EIS
exemption under the inadequate board rules. The court, finding
a potentially significant effect on the quality of the environment
in the circumstances of the Classic "U" sale, 99 ordered the prep-
aration of an EIS despite the Class III designation. 100 The court
concluded that the forest practices board had exceeded its
authority by attempting to exempt from SEPA a forest practice
with a potential for substantial impact on the environment.0 1 In
reclassification to Class IV. Minutes of the State of Washington Forest Practices Board
13 (Jan. 8, 1981). But this latitude will be lost, according to the DNR, once the new Class
IV regulations are promulgated. Id. at 14.
98. No. 78-9806, mem. op. (Wash. Super. Ct., Island County, June 23, 1978).
99. When the Department of Natural Resources sells timber, the forest practice
required for the harvest must be predetermined for the purpose of writing the contract.
The decision to sell is the decision to harvest. Because it would be illogical for the DNR
to deny a permit to harvest, the appropriate point to evaluate the forest practices appli-
cation is while deciding to sell. This is not the case, however, with a private timber har-
vest. The appropriate point for evaluation in that case is upon application for a permit.
The 255 acre Classic "U" tract had been sold for harvesting without the benefit of
an EIS. Originally, the entire tract had been scheduled for clear-cutting, except for selec-
tive logging of a buffer strip along the highway between the tract and South Whidbey
State Park. A portion of the trees in the tract is in a rare period of succession unique to
Whidbey Island. Adverse effects on certain unusual wildlife populations also were
expected from the clear-cut. Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem. op. at 12 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
Island County, June 23, 1978).
100. Id. at 15. Defendants contended that the categorical exemption granted by the
Council on Environmental Policy exempting all timber sales from SEPA was controlling.
The court found, however, that because the sale contract included entitlements of use, it
satisfied SEPA requirements of a major action. Id. at 3. Furthermore, the court could not
find that the legislature intended timber sales to be considered as forest practices, and
concluded, therefore, that timber sales were not regulated by the Forest Practices Act.
Id. at 4-5.
The EIS for the Classic "U" timber sale was issued June 12, 1981. CLASSIC "U" EIS,
supra note 13. The proposed action, the result of a compromise settlement reached
between the parties to the Noel v. Cole litigation, differs considerably from the original
proposal to clear-cut the entire 255 acre tract. Id. As proposed, the tract is to be divided
into seven units, three to be scheduled for immediate clear-cutting, with some salvage of
wind-thrown trees on other parcels. The remaining four parcels will be clear-cut over a
period of approximately ten years. A fifteen acre buffer strip between the parcel and
South Whidbey State Park will be left for twenty years, after which it will be selectively
logged. Id.
101. The court stated:
[I]t is further apparent that the legislature anticipated that some forest prac-
tices would require compliance with SEPA since they did not exempt Class IV
practices from the scope of SEPA . . . . Under the Forest Practices Act any
forest practice which has a potential for a substantial impact on the environ-
ment must have an "evaluation" to determine whether or not a detailed state-
ment must be prepared pursuant to SEPA. . ..
94 University of Puget Sound Law Review
the Classic "U" case, the forest practices regulations proved
insufficient to enable the DNR to identify critical environmental
concerns, such as an increase in recreational uses of Whidbey
Island forest land with a concurrent decrease in forest land
area.102 To the extent that the board's Class IV definition
thwarted the legislative intent to require agency evaluation of
these concerns, it was declared invalid. 03
The Noel court premised its interpretation of the forest
practices regulations on legislative intent not to exempt all for-
est practices from SEPA, but rather to allow exemptions only
where the forest practices regulations provide adequate environ-
mental protection."' The 1981 amendment to SEPA does not
change that interpretation.0 5 Although a case-by-case judicial
review of forest practices would specify those which the legisla-
ture intended to exempt from the requirement for an EIS, litiga-
tion is unquestionably a cumbersome, expensive method to
effect agency review. The list itself would foster continual chal-
lenge. The function of judicial review in assuring environmental
protection must be to deter the tendency of agencies to short-
cut the thoughtful decisionmaking required by SEPA.1o6
Clearly, the legislature has delegated the function of balanc-
ing the benefits to be gained by a proposed activity against its
environmental effects to the forest practices board.107 This bal-
ancing is not the court's role. 08 But the board must articulate a
balance that satisfies the intent of the FPA.
. . . It seems apparent to this Court, in view of the intent and purpose of
SEPA, that the above undisputed facts clearly establish that there existed a
reasonable probability that the clear-cutting of the Classic "U" tract would
have more than a moderate effect on the quality of environment.
Noel v. Cole, No. 78-9806, mem. op. at 10, 14 (Wash. Super. Ct., Island County, June 23,
1978) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 12.
103. The forest practices board undertook a Class IV study, but proposed adoption
of only one of the fifteen suggested additions to the class. PROPOSED REGULATIONS
CHANGES EIS, supra note 35, at 7-11. A second Class IV study prompted two additional
changes. See supra note 94.
104. Such a construction avoids the constitutional question which seemed to be the
main issue during the passage of the 1981 amendment to SEPA. See supra note 18.
105. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
106. ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685, 700-01, 601 P.2d 501,
512 (1979).
107. WASH. Rv. CoDz § 76.09.040(1) (1981).





The current forest practices regulations hamper the DNR's
environmental assessment of forest practices applications. Under
regulations severely restricting forest practices subject to SEPA,
the DNR cannot fulfill its own role under SEPA. The regula-
tions do not recognize the potential threat of applications that
present adverse site-specific conditions that cannot be mitigated
by imposed conditions, or locations where cumulative harms
endanger a stable environment. Even a broadening of the narrow
list of categories presently encompassed in the Class IV forest
practices regulations is unlikely to reach many conceivable con-
ditions found on forest practice applications. Unless the forest
practices board's regulations are amended to give the DNR the
necessary latitude to make meaningful environmental evalua-
tions, the DNR's exempted forest practice applications will
remain subject to voidance by a court.
If the Class IV forest practices regulations persist in
restricting the scope of SEPA review beyond the intent of the
Forest Practices Act, then the exemptions from SEPA provisions
provided by SEPA and the Forest Practices Act must be
removed. Without explicit exemptions, Class III practices would
receive the additional environmental review required under
SEPA to identify those specific applications with potentially
harmful consequences now unrecognized by the rules.
Washington's forests are the foundation of the state's eco-
nomic and recreational life. Sound environmental policy for the
preservation of forest lands for future generations is an indispu-
table necessity, demanding continual and critical legislative
review of the policy's effectiveness, and prompt remedies when
administrative solutions have failed. The legislature should not
leave these remedies to the courts. Uncertainty over the scope of
forest practices exemptions from SEPA deserves legislative
clarification.
Christine M. Cordes
1982]
